The use of concept maps for the diffusion of the Distributed  Operations concept and the propagation of existing virtual  training simulations by Boone, Brian S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-03
The use of concept maps for the diffusion of the
Distributed  Operations concept and the propagation
of existing virtual  training simulations
Boone, Brian S.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
This thesis was completed with the cooperation of the MOVES Institute 
THE USE OF CONCEPT MAPS FOR THE DIFFUSION OF 
THE DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS CONCEPT AND THE 





Brian S. Boone 
 
March 2008 
 Thesis Advisor:   Amela Sadagic 
 Second Reader: Joseph Sullivan 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
The Use of Concept Maps for the Diffusion of the Distributed Operations Concept 
and the Dissemination of Existing Virtual Training Simulations 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Brian S. Boone 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The Marine Corps finds itself increasingly fighting an elusive, adaptive and decentralized enemy.  Facing this type of 
decentralized enemy suggests the Marine Corps embrace a more decentralized approach to conventional military 
operations.  One of the strategies that the USMC has been introducing is Distributed Operations (DO) that will enable 
meeting the need of commanders to fight a highly decentralized engagement.  DO require that the Marine Corps add 
to its conventional skills the additive ability to decentralize decision making and an ability to distribute the force when 
it is tactically advantageous to do so. Lessons learned from the Hunter Warrior series of experiments suggest that 
technology can only be effectively applied once assigned tasks have been mastered.  In order for the Marine Corps to 
enable DO capability throughout the Marine Corps, a proactive information campaign must be conducted.  The thesis 
seeks to develop a web based collaboration tool which will link critical DO specific and conventional skills to the 
current simulations which train them.  This will serve to increase all Marines’ understanding of the requisite 





15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
89 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Distributed Operations, Maneuver Warfare, Concept Map,  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE USE OF CONCEPT MAPS FOR THE DIFFUSION OF THE DISTRIBUTED 
OPERATIONS CONCEPT AND THE PROPAGATION OF EXISTING VIRTUAL 
TRAINING SIMULATIONS 
 
Brian S. Boone 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
Bachelor of Arts, Old Dominion University, 1999 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 


























Mathias Kolsch, Ph.D. 
Chair, MOVES Academic Committee 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The Marine Corps finds itself increasingly fighting an elusive, adaptive and 
decentralized enemy.  Facing this type of decentralized enemy suggests the Marine Corps 
embrace a more decentralized approach to conventional military operations.  One of the 
strategies that the USMC has been introducing is Distributed Operations (DO) that will 
enable meeting the need of commanders to fight a highly decentralized engagement.  DO 
require that the Marine Corps add to its conventional skills the additive ability to 
decentralize decision making and an ability to distribute the force when it is tactically 
advantageous to do so. Lessons learned from the Hunter Warrior series of experiments 
suggest that technology can only be effectively applied once assigned tasks have been 
mastered.  In order for the Marine Corps to enable DO capability throughout the Marine 
Corps, a proactive information campaign must be conducted.  The thesis seeks to develop 
a web based collaboration tool which will link critical DO specific and conventional 
skills to the current simulations which train them.  This will serve to increase all Marines’ 
understanding of the requisite knowledge and introduce novel training opportunities that 
exist as the concept of DO is concurrently developed.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was 
the Perl Harbor event that has pushed the United States into its current Global War on 
Terror (GWOT).  As the United States prosecutes the GWOT, it finds itself engaged in 
urban, asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The enemy in Afghanistan and Iraq 
quickly realized the futility of attempting to engage the U.S. in a conventional force on 
conventional force engagement.  As a result the enemy has altered its warfare tactics into 
a style that maximizes on its critical strengths.  The warfare tactics that have emerged 
from these conflicts by our enemy have sought to expose the limited ability of U. S. 
conventional forces to conduct irregular warfare.  Our enemy’s approach is to distribute 
its own forces and expose a critical vulnerability of our conventional forces.  In Iraq, this 
tactic has worked well and continues to erode our national will.  
The Marines fighting in Iraq now find themselves fighting a distributed enemy 
engaging in irregular warfare without possessing themselves a formalized DO capability.  
Marines fighting in the streets of cities in Iraq may well be fighting in close proximity to 
each other, but they are virtually isolated from each other due to a lack of a formalized 
distributed operations capability.  There is emerging a critical need for Marine forces to 
possess an ability to conduct autonomous to semi-autonomous tactical actions to engage a 
distributed enemy. 
What does this emerging operational concept precisely include?  Currently there 
are no manuals or definition that one can find as compared to older concepts like 
maneuver warfare.  There is simply not enough time to fully flush out all the details of 
the concept prior to implementation, the time for a formalized distributed operation 
capability is now.  Commandant G. W. Hagee, the former Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, along with other top Marine theorists have entered the discussion to attempt to 
provide an initial idea at what the distributed operations operational concept will look 
like.  In this emerging concept, Commanders will possess the ability to aggregate and 
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disaggregate their forces when it is tactically prudent to do so in order to exploit the 
critical vulnerabilities of the enemy.  Distributed operations will be an added capability.  
The skill set necessary to conduct such operations will extend beyond the traditional 
infantry squad skills and will place much greater responsibility on the shoulders of small 
unit leaders.  In some cases, the responsibilities that were normally handled by a first 
lieutenant or captain could be the responsibility of a small squad leader.  Marines at all 
levels of command will be required to acquire higher proficiency level of the 
conventional skills they already possess.   
In order for the Marine Corp to successfully implement the DO concept, clearly 
there is a requirement for a significant increase in the level of education and training 
given to the individual Marine.  The target group for the most intense training will be 
small unit leaders (Goulding, 2005; Erdie, 2005).  The fundamental focus of the 
education and training of the individual Marine must be effective small team leadership, 
decision making skills, and training to enable small unit leaders to become “brilliant at 
the basics” (Amos, 2007).  The small unit leader will only be able to conduct Calls for 
Fire (CFF) and Close Air Support (CAS) when they are provided adequate training.  
Unfortunately the current operation tempo necessary to sustain the GWOT has stretched 
thin training opportunities throughout the Marine Corps.  Due to the current OPTEMPO 
in support of the GWOT, there is clearly a strain on conducting the foundational training 
of basic infantry skills, let alone attempting to train an additive capability.  In the past 
modeling and simulation has provided the initial procedural training for achievement of 
such skill sets.  Modeling and simulation technology must be harnessed to further 
facilitate the training of Marines for distributed operations. 
For distributed operations to become an operational reality, not only must the 
small unit leaders become “brilliance at the basics,” but commanders must possess 
confidence in the decision making skills of these lower level Marines (Goulding, 2006).  
The small unit leaders must possess the skills to carry out the commander’s intent in an 
irregular and complex environment.  In order to effectively facilitate this operational 
concept there must also be a promulgation of the concept of DO itself.  Essential to the 
conduct of DO is an understanding up and down the chain of command of the concept. 
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Subject matter experts in the field of distributed operation have suggested the Marine 
Corps undertake an information campaign even as the concept is developed (Penn, 2006).  
Only then, when all Marines up and down the command chain understand how best to 
employ this additive capability and sustain the units that provide it, will commanders 
have confidence and trust in small unit leaders to conduct such operations. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As stated previously, one of the major requirements for achieving a DO capability 
will be the further education and training of the small unit leader and the individual 
Marine.  Since it is necessary to provide the small unit leaders a broader understanding of 
the requisite knowledge that unit now resides in the understanding of more senior 
Marines, many question as to how the Marine Corps will achieve this emerge.  An initial 
inquiry into elements of these critical questions is what motivated this thesis work.  These 
questions are essential for the Marine Corps to answer as it moves forward in its 
concurrent formulation of the concept of DO.  The questions that specifically motivated 
this thesis work include: 
1. What are the emerging training requirements which are necessary for the 
individual Marine to master in order to conduct distributed operations? 
2. How can the identification and mapping those skills help achieve a much 
needed information campaign on the concept of distributed operations to 
the entire Marine Corps? 
3. Since DO is understood to be an additive capability and the Marine Corps’ 
OPTEMPO is straining the current training schedule, can virtual 
simulation training supplement  the current training program? 
4. What type of collaborative tools need to be created to employ the use of 
concept maps to empower those undertaking a DO campaign to 
collaboratively share information on the DO concept and point end users 
to virtual training simulation which can train specifically identified 
conventional and DO critical skills?   
The work of this thesis evolved from a desire to begin to explore and answer the 
questions above in order to help facilitate the Marine Corps’ implementation of the 
distributed operations concept. 
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C. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will focus on answering questions 1 and 4, specifically in 
the support of the concurrent formulation of a concept of distributed operations. The 
work in this thesis will identify conventional and DO specific critical skills and develop a 
collaborative tool that links virtual training simulations ideal for enabling the education 
and training requirements which are emerging from the formulation of the DO 
operational concept.  The thesis will also provide useful pointers and considerations for 
question 2 and 3.  The thesis study will contribute to and become a part of a much needed 
information campaign to educate Marines at all ranks on the emerging concept of DO.   
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
• Chapter I: Introduction.  This chapter elaborates the motivations for this research, 
states the research questions, and establishes a framework for pursuing answers to 
the stated questions. 
• Chapter II: Literature Review.  This chapter provides a review of the current 
literature that has shaped the Marine Corps concept for DO and the concurrent 
nature of its development. 
• Chapter III: Information campaign. This chapter demonstrates the need for 
diffusion of the emerging concept of distributed operations throughout the Marine 
Corps and the need to enter into a thoughtful information push strategy for the 
concept of DO.   
• Chapter IV: Diffusion of Innovation.  This chapter discusses four major elements 
necessary for diffusion of innovation and how each applies to a DO information 
campaign. 
• Chapter V: Representing USMC competencies in Concept Maps.  This chapter 
explains the CMAP tool and the approach taken to delineate the critical skills 
necessary for enabling DO 
• Chapter VI: Virtual Training Simulations. This chapter discusses how virtual 
training simulation can supplement existing training programs.  An example of 
the essential information needed for each simulation is given.  A few examples of 
the concept maps generated for the purpose of the thesis are given and discussed. 
• Chapter VII: Development of Search Tool. This chapter explains the process of 
transitioning the generated concept maps into an XML format that can be used to 
facilitate a search capability which is necessary link critical skills to current 
virtual training simulations.   
• Chapter VIII: Future Work. This chapter offers areas of possible future 
experimentation to test the usability of the diffusion tool.   
• Chapter IX: Conclusion  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter of the thesis covers a review of the literature that has shaped and 
continues to shape the formulation of distributed operations.  DO is being developed as 
an operational concept which is concurrently being tested and evaluated.  As such, the 
very definition of the emerging concept is fluid and is being influenced by the current 
testing and experimentation.  One of the most critical points emerging from this 
concurrent discussion, testing, and implementation is the need to focus training intensely 
on small unit leaders and educate them on the DO concept.  
A. DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS AS AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
First and foremost, it is vital to keep as a central guiding principle the fact that 
distributed operations is an operational concept.  As an operational concept, DO must be 
further developed, tested and implemented.  The Marine Corps cannot develop a 
distributed operations capability in a linear fashion where the concept is fully defined and 
shaped, move on to perform experiments, and then finally begin to implement the 
concept.  Figure 1 demonstrates the concurrent manner in which DO are being developed.  
All three phases are happening simultaneously and are influencing and shaping each 
other. Bring the DO capability about in this manner will deliver the final product to the 
Marine Corps in the shortest time possible.   
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Figure 1.   Concurrent Implementation of DO Concept (Figure taken from MCWL Power 
Point Presentation on DO) 
The concept phase is being conducted by the ongoing debate on the concept 
which is occurring in various military journals and publications.  The Experimentation 
phase is being conducted by groups such as MCWL, with its Sea Viking 06, Sea Viking 
08, and Sea Viking 10 experiments, with the help of the Training and Education 
Command (TECOM) and Twentynine Palms in California.  The implementation phase is 
being conducted with the assistance of MCWL and Twentynine Palms with the assistance 
of groups like the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines (1/3) who upon the return from their 
deployment to Iraq in May of 2005 selected one platoon to receive specialized distributed 
operations training.  Upon completion of the DO training, the unit subsequently deployed 
to Afghanistan and conducted operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) (Observations and lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom VI, Nov 2006).  The 
definition, experimentation, and implementation are occurring simultaneously and are 
influencing each other in significant ways, all working toward the goal of the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps to produce in short order a formidable DO capability.  
Since the operational concept is being developed in such a manner, there is an emerging 
need to capture the critical training skills which are emerging from each phase. 
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B. CONCEPTUALIZATION 
The fluid nature of the definition of DO itself can be seen from a careful study of 
the literature on the subject.  In one early publication on DO it was insisted that the time 
had come for experts to “engage in a spirited broad based debate on distributed 
operations” (Hanlon, 2004).  As this debate unfolded, a number of questions started to 
emerge on the nature of the DO concept itself.  Many experts felt these questions were 
presenting real hindrances to a common understanding of distributed operations.  These 
questions were initially articulated in an article (Dobson, 2004) which asked: 
• Are distributed operations an additive capability or does it constitute a new 
mission? 
• What will be the size of the distributed operations capable force and will the 
structure of the platoon/squad/team change? 
• How will the distributed operations capable force aggregate and disaggregate 
to achieve the desired effects? 
• What are the training requirements associated with distributed operations and 
how are those skills trained while maintaining proficiency in other essential 
tasks? 
As estimated by the author, these questions were a great starting place as the concept 
refinement and experimentation phase commenced wrestling with the details of the 
operational concept.  The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), which was 
assigned the task of conducting experimentation for the DO concept, conducted focused 
research efforts to identify the essential tasks behind the DO concept; the goal of which 
was to guide the necessary experimentation in this domain.  MCWL’s experimentation 
Division’s Plans Branch searched the mission essential task list of various Marine units in 
an effort to identify what skill sets a DO unit should possess.   
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, M. W. Hagee wrote an article which 
attempted to address some of these questions while it left most of the questions 
unanswered and open to further debate and experimentation.  The article provided a 
general direction for developers and experimenters to follow.  The article explained that 
DO included a set of tactics which aimed at gaining a tactical advantage over the enemy 
by deliberately separating the force, yet maintaining connectivity by leveraging the 
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command and control advantage enjoyed by U. S. forces.  The article stated that “The 
essence of this concept lies in the capacity for coordinated action by dispersed units, 
throughout the breath and depth of the battlespace, ordered and connected within an 
operational design focused on a common aim” (Hagee, 2005). 
In the article the Commandant stated that the concept of distributed operations 
“was a natural extension of maneuver warfare” which sought a spatial and temporal 
advantage. (Hagee, 2005).  DO, it was argued, seek to create a spatial advantage with 
highly trained small units extending the battlespace outside the capabilities of the enemy.  
Distributed operations will exploit difficult terrain that the enemy is currently using as a 
critical strength by leveraging the extended force knowledge of the battlespace in order to 
conduct close combat or supporting arms.  The distribution of authority to small unit 
leaders who are the ones most directly engaged in the fight is of the utmost importance.  
The article argues that “By moving authority ‘downward,’ we will dramatically increase 
the speed of command.  This distribution of authority among many seasoned and well-
trained junior leaders will result in a combination of actions that creates for the enemy a 
rapidly deteriorating, cascading effect, shattering his cohesion.” (Hagee, 2005) 
Other contributors to the DO discussion attempted to address some of the 
questions which were hindering a common understanding of the DO concept.  One 
answer emerged (Schmidle, 2004), defining distributed operations as a capability which 
will be additive in nature.  In the article, it is stated that “Distributed Operations are 
characterized by the physical dispersion of networked units over an extended battlespace.  
Battalion – to squad-sized formations can conduct such operations.  These operations 
avoid linear, sequential, and predictable operations”.  One important thing to note is that 
the concept of DO critically includes the ability of squad sized units performing a 
distinctive set of operations.  The author also asserted that “Distributed operations 
provide an additive capability to the MAGTF commander.  They give him the ability to 
influence a much greater area of the battlespace, both in depth and breadth, than can be 
accomplished with more conventional operations”.  Not only are the small units required 
to master the current critical skill necessary for conventional operations, but they will be 
required to train and master an additional set of new skills. 
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The material presented in (Hagee, 2005) article attempted to address the training 
requirements and size/structure questions by addressing the foundation of a DO 
capability, which is identified as the individual Marine. It was proposed that DO as a 
concept will not drastically change or supplant the current organization of Infantry units, 
nor will it diminish the unit’s ability to conduct conventional warfare.  DO, on the 
contrary, will provide an additional capability which commanders can employ as the 
tactical situation dictates.  Commanders will be empowered to use this added capability 
to exploit the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and attack his strategic center of gravity.  
The DO concept will focus on the Marine Corps’ most important asset, the individual 
Marine and especially the small unit leaders.  In the same article, the individual Marine 
was clearly identified as the cornerstone on which a distributed operations capability was 
to be built.  The article states, “One of the principle requirements for development of a 
distributed operations capability will be the further enhancement of training and 
professional education for small-unit leaders and individual Marines.  Building on our 
existing ethos and our maneuver warfare philosophy, we must continue to elevate the 
already high competence of our most junior leaders, educating them to think and act at 
the tactical level of war, with an understanding of the application of commander’s intent 
to achieve operational level effects”.  This sentiment echoed what had been previously 
asserted in (Schmidle, 2004), namely the importance of educating and training the small 
unit leader to enable a DO capability.  When addressing some of the question raised by 
Dobson, the author stated “The basic building block of distributed operations is the rifle 
squad, augmented as necessary with mission essential specialists.  Underpinning this 
capability will be additional small unit training focused on independent tactical actions.  
This training will be part of the ESG/MEU predeployment training cycle.  These squad-
sized distributed operations teams may be inserted as individual teams or collectively in 
platoon- or company-sized configurations.  When inserted as part of a larger formation, 
the units can disaggregate and maneuver to their assigned operating areas or operate from 
a platoon or company patrol base.” 
As the difficult question underlying the development of a DO capability are 
continually expressed, debated, and answered, the conceptualization, testing, and 
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implementation of the DO concept continues.  The articulation of the DO concept is 
influencing and feeding into the testing and experimentation process.  As the concept 
continues to take its shape, the need to share the emerging concept grows as well.  
Emerging from the debate on the concept is the thought that the attention of the training 
efforts must by on the individual Marine, which is the hinge on which the DO concept 
turns to become a reality.    
C. EXPERIMENTATION  
In the interest of transitioning the Marine Corps force to possess a DO capability, 
the Commandant in early 2005 tasked the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) to 
conduct experiments aimed at implementing the DO concept.  The Experiment Division 
conducted the Distributed Operations Advanced Warfighting Experiment during a period 
of 10 days in October of 2006.  This was part of the Sea Viking 06 series of experiments, 
which are to be followed by similar experiments, Sea Viking 08 and Sea Viking 10.  In 
the Quicklook Report from the Sea Viking 2006 Advanced Warfighting Experiment, it 
was noted that one of lessons learned from the collective experiment was that “DO 
required an increased level of training and education” (Penn, 2006).  The article stressed 
that the Marine Corps leadership as a whole needed to be better educated on the concept 
of DO to enable commander’s to have a better understanding of a DO unit’s inherent 
strengths and weaknesses.  At the small unit level, the focus on education and training 
needed to include training in the fundamentals of “small team leadership, decision 
making, and individuals being brilliant at the basics” (Penn, 2006) 
The experiments which were conducted during Sea Viking 2006 demonstrated 
that small unit leaders could conduct calls for fire and close air support only when they 
were provided sufficient training.  The study also found that a solid foundation of Basic 
infantry skills needed to be reestablished especially at the small unit level.  The Article 
noted that the “decision making capability of the small unit leaders needs to be improved. 
Poor decisions were indicative of small unit leaders’ lack of maturity and/or the need for 
additional training” (Penn, 2006)  The article further concluded that a dedicated DO 
campaign be initiated to educate all levels of the Marine Corps in order to correct the 
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general lack of understanding of what DO is.  The article stated,  “Marines at all levels in 
the wider Corps community generally lack understanding of that DO is, the changes that 
are install, the challenges, future developments, and flow-on effects in other areas.  
Recommendation: it is strongly asserted that a dedicated DO information campaign be 
instigated to push information to all areas of the Corps, especially schools, the operating 
force units, and staff who have an impact on the venture” (Penn, 2006) 
In the Observations and lessons From Operation Enduring freedom (OEF) VI 
publication put together by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), the 
MCCLL team conducted interviews with 43 key leaders from the 1/3.  They additionally 
surveyed 266 Sergeants and below upon their return to their home station.  They found 
from the interviews and the surveys conducted on individuals involved with the DO 
experimentation that success in DO was based on three key factors; namely small unit 
self protection, positive communication, and most importantly leadership (Distributed 
Operations in Afghanistan, 2006).  They concluded that units will distribute only down to 
the level at which competent leadership exists.  This involves understanding 
commander’s intent and possessing the ability, without direct orders, to take action to 
facilitate commander’s intent.  One interviewee noted, “The Corporal Fire Team Leader 
can’t be a novice at all the skills in his fire team.  He needs to be able to teach them.  It 
should not be done several levels up the training echelon.  You want to do distributed 
operations down to the Fire Team level because there are situations where that’s certainly 
applicable, but then that Corporal needs to be brought up on the education level so he can 
not only demonstrate proficiency to the rest of his fire team and supervise that 
proficiency.  What we saw was a platoon full of truly tremendous people that were fully 
motivated to do it but had never been drilled and skilled to the point.  Prior to training, 
the Corporals really were not skilled in navigation, much less trying to teach compass 
reading to their Marines.  The furthest we can go to making this concept completely 
applicable is not the technology route; it’s the training and education of the youngest 
leaders” (Dotto, 2006). 
This suggests that the individual Infantry Squad leader must possess a much 
broader understanding of intelligence cycles, calls for fire, and logistics and C2 systems.  
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The need for extensive new training at all levels of the small unit clearly emerges from all 
three phases of the concurrent model.  The increased training could possible increase 
schooling durations for DO enabled units.  The training requirements will also put a 
significant time strain on a Marine Corps already stretched thin trying to meet current 
deployment cycles in support of the GWOT.  There could possibly be an increase in 
demand for qualified trainers for these critical skills.  This is clearly an area where virtual 
training simulations could be used as a supplemental training tool and play an 
increasingly effective role. 
From a close review of the current literature on DO it is clear that there is a 
pressing need to focus training efforts on small unit leaders.  A close look at the literature 
demonstrates that the concept itself is being discussed and worked out in various Marine 
Corps publications.  At the same time vital experimentation is taking place, which in 
itself is influencing the definition of the concept.  As the DO concept is continually 
formed, the small unit leader must not only master the conventional skills he currently 
trains, but quickly ingest the additional skills which are necessary to enable DO.  Equally 
important is the dissemination of the concept to all members of the Marine Corps.  There 
is a pressing need for the Marine Corps to develop a push strategy to all of its individual 
Marines.  This information campaign is as crucial as the development of the concept 
itself.    
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III. INFORMATION CAMPAIGN 
In order for DO to become an operational reality it is necessary for small unit 
leaders become masters of the basics of conventional operations.  Not only is this so, but 
commanders must possess confidence in the decision making skills of these small unit 
leaders.  The small unit leaders must possess the skills to carry out the commander’s 
intent in an ever increasingly complex environment.  To facilitate this concept, the 
Marine Corps must initiate a focused push strategy to all Marines at every level of the 
chain of command.  What is essential for the conduct of DO is an understanding at all 
levels of the chain of command of the concept.   There must be subject matter experts in 
the field of DO who will engage in an information campaign to introduce the concept to 
the end users.  Only when all Marines in the command chain understand how best to 
employ this additive capability, will commanders have confidence and trust in small unit 
leaders to conduct such operations. 
A. EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR SMALL UNIT LEADERS 
One of the major obstacles for the Marine Corps to achieving a DO capability is 
the training and education of small unit leaders.  The small unit leaders are the front line 
of implementation of the DO concept.  Not only must these individuals be highly trained 
at the conventional skills, be brilliant at the basics and ready to disburse the force, but 
they must also be able to quickly learn the emerging DO specific skills.  The DO concept 
is being developed in a concurrent manner.  The time to linearly step through 
conceptualization, testing, and implementation does not exist.  Small unit leaders need a 
formalized DO in today’s war in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The concurrent development of 
the DO concept suggests focusing education and training on the tip of the DO spear, the 
small unit leaders.  As mentioned before the training time for these units is limited and it 
is shrinking due to operational commitments.  These small unit leaders must not simply 
understand the technical skills necessary to enable DO, but they must gain a general 
understanding of the concept and their role in the overall DO concept.  In is essential, if 
commanders will entrust low level leaders to accomplish tasks normally handled by much 
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senior unit leaders, that the lower level leaders understand not simply technical aspect of 
a call for fire, but tactically how and why this is being employed.  Only then will these 
small unit leaders possess the semi autonomous decision skills so desperately sought by 
the architects of the DO concept.   
B. NEED FOR INFORMATION CAMPAIGN 
The more all levels of leaders in the Marine Corps familiarize themselves with the 
development of the concept and the critical skills required, the easier the adoption of the 
concept will be.  The DO innovation itself is not enough to sell the idea to all rank in the 
Marine Corps.  A concerted push strategy must be undertaken by those wanting the 
Marine Corps to realize a DO capability.  As part of the push strategy, all viable avenues 
to further the understanding and development of the concept should be embraced.  It is 
the purpose of this thesis to develop one, of what is hoped to be many, communication 
tools to push the concept of DO.  It is essential for the Marine Corps to develop tools for 
users to become familiar with the essential mission areas, training tasks, and virtual 
simulation training available to users.   
C. CURRENT INFORMATION CHANNELS 
There are currently a number of information channels through which the Marine 
Corps disseminates critical information to members of the Corps.  The communication 
channel can be categorized as either interpersonal or mass media.  Interpersonal channels 
involve face to face exchanges between two or more individuals.  The mass media channel is 
a means of transmitting information from one source to an audience of many rapidly.  In the 
past, the Marine Corps has employed books and manuals to distribute operational concepts to 
various commands and school houses where leaders go about the work of providing these 
resources to lower level members.   These traditional information channels are cumbersome, 
very often slow, and can be costly (production and delivery). The World Wide Web has 
emerged as a terrific mass media channel through which information is pushed to the 
maximum amount of users.  Almost every Marine of all ranks has access to the web and 
therefore this information channel ban effectively be used to distribute information.  It is vital 
that any information campaign undertaken by the Marine Corps be designed to maximize the 
benefits offered by the web.    
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IV. DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 
This chapter looks at the critical elements that enable diffusion.  A brief overview 
of the critical element key to the diffusion of any new innovation is discussed.  The role 
these elements play will be laid as a foundation for the approach suggested by this thesis 
to assist in both an information campaign on DO and the role a communication tool can 
play in connecting users to information on virtual training simulations.   
A. BASIC ELEMENTS 
As has been previously asserted, the concurrent formulation of the DO concept 
presents developers, implementers, and users with unique challenges.  As the concept 
continues to take shape there is a pressing need to disseminate the knowledge of the 
concept and the critical skills necessary to enable effective training to enable the concept.  
There is a real need for the Marine Corps to engage in a focused information campaign to 
diffuse the emerging notion of DO to all levels of the chain of command of the Marine 
Corps and beyond.  For the purpose of this thesis, the theoretical framework chosen from 
which to implement an information campaign was adopted from Diffusion of Innovation 
(DI) theory.  This theory has been since the early 1950 as a framework from which to 
understand how innovation id adopted.  There are a couple of critical elements that 
facilitate the diffusion of any new innovation.  It is important for any industry or group 
seeking to gain adoption of a new technology and new concepts to understand how 
elements such as innovation, time, social structure, and the communication channel effect 
the diffusion of innovation.  It is important to understand how these elements could 
impact the diffusion of DO.     
Diffusion is defined as “the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 
1995).  There are four main elements that emerge out of this definition which can be 
found in every diffusion effort.  The elements are: 
• Innovation 
• Communication Channels 
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• Time 
• Social Systems 
A quick overview of these elements is beneficial to any work attempting to assist in an 
information campaign, or in an effort to have any the concept of DO diffused and 
accepted by adopters.  A consideration of these elements will help developers understand 
how they can best facilitate the DO concept and ultimately to educate the users about the 
use of virtual training simulations available to train emerging DO skills.   
 Innovation must be more than just new or beneficial in order to ensure that the 
innovation will be adopted and best employed by the majority of its potential users.  The 
innovation itself is not enough to sell itself; often a well planned and thought out “push” 
strategy is necessary.  The adoption of any particular innovation is a complex 
phenomenon which is influenced, most heavily, by the four main factors mentioned 
earlier.  Each factor will be examined and necessary connections to the DO domain will 
be made.   
B. INNOVATION 
An innovation “is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 1995).  Defined in this manner, it does not 
matter if the innovation is really new or if it is just perceived as new.  This applies 
particularly well to the emerging concept of DO.  DO have been conducted by various 
units in previous military conflicts.  The tactics employed were never labeled distributed 
operations, nor were the operations formalized in any way.  What now is being attempted 
is the formal delineation of DO as an operational concept.  Once the concept is spelled 
out, there will be an urgent need to disseminate those tactics in order to facilitate a broad 
understanding and education of the concept.     
DO have been described by some as a new warfighting concept which is being 
adopted by the United States Marine Corps and is being developed by the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory.  It is seen by many as a response to the changing post 9-11 
environment the United States finds itself in.  If the enemy has incorporated a distributed 
posture in order to spread our forces and create moments of tactical advantages for 
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themselves, and if the enemy is moving the fight into environments which are more 
complex, it is imperative that the Marine Corps develop a conventional force which has 
the flexibility to employ a DO capability whenever and where ever it deems operationally 
advantageous.   
As mentioned previously, the employment of distributed tactics has been 
employed in the past with great effectiveness.  DO have been employed numerous times 
by various units from different countries.  For example, the British Special Forces 
employed a distributed operations concept in the Falkland Islands Campaign (Hagee, 
2005).  The Finns employed a distributed force against a numerically superior force in the 
1940 winter campaign against the Soviet Union.  The Marine Corps itself employed a 
distributed force in combat missions in Vietnam under the operation known as Combined 
Action Program (Hagee, 2005).  The main point is that Distributed Operations has a 
historical context.  What is new is the desire for the Marine Corps to codify the tactic into 
an operational concept with specifically identified critical skills and to push this concept 
as quickly as possible to all members to adopt.     
C. COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
Communication is defined as the process by which participants create and share 
information with one another in order to reach a mutual understanding” (Rogers, 1995).  
Diffusion is one type of communication in which the information shared involves a new 
idea or concept.  For the case of DO, the process of communication involves: 
• an innovation of DO 
• an individual or other unit of adoption that has specific knowledge of the DO 
innovation or experience using it 
• another individual or other unit without such knowledge 
The aim of employing a dedicated communication tool is to act as one of several 
channels through which this information can be disseminated.  The use of the World 
Wide Web and web based tools will be an integral part of this communication channel.  
The goal is to reach as many individuals as possible.  The fact that the internet and web 
based tools are as widespread as contemporary communication tools, compels those who 
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seek the greatest diffusion of their innovation to use these tools.  Each Marine unit 
currently enjoys access to the web.  The critical infrastructure necessary for 
implementation of a viral communication channel already exists at almost every Marine’s 
fingertips.  Marines at most military installation also have access to the Secret Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), which can allow for the classification, access 
control, and dissemination of such information.   
D. TIME 
The next element in the consideration of diffusion is the element of time.  The 
time element is primarily concerned with a term called the rate of adoption.  The rate of 
adoption is defined as “the relative speed with which an innovation is adopted by 
members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995).  The general pattern of adoption has a few 
early adopters in the beginning, with the rate of diffusion growing over time, with finally 
a period where the rate of adoption levels off.  The Y axis represents the percentage of 
adoption and the X axis represents time.  The resulting S curve represents the basic 
pattern for adoption of most innovation (Figure 2).  The rate of adoption is normally 
taken to be the amount of time that is required for a certain number of users to embrace 
the innovation.  One of the primary hopes of this thesis is that the tool developed will 
facilitate and increase this rate of adoption.   
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Figure 2.   S curve of Adoption of Innovation (Figure taken from www.unodc.org) 
E. SOCIAL SYSTEM 
The military is a unique social system with its own hierarchy, activities, missions, 
and culture.  Understanding this unique social system will yield key insights into how to 
best employ a push strategy for the greatest diffusion of the DO concept.  The common 
goal of the Marine Corps is to “locate, close with, and destroy the enemy.”  DO seek to 
codify a new set of skills by which to accomplish that common mission.  The structure of 
the military offers unique insights into how this innovation will be diffused.  The Marine 
Corps comprises a highly motivated group of individuals who will be less resistant to 
innovation once the senior leaders in the organization have embraced the innovation.  The 
chain of command offers a specialize structure for diffusion of any particular innovation.  
Once the decision has been made to embrace and adopt the innovation by senior officials, 
normally the rank and file adopt very quickly.   The military command structure offers a 
unique social system where adoption is facilitated by the command structure.  Once the 
Unit leaders adopt, the command structure ensures those of subordinate ranks will adopt 
as well.   
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As the DO concept continues to evolve and take shape it is vital for the Marine 
Corps to understand the elements which most significantly affect the diffusion of any 
innovation.  This understanding is necessary in order to quickly train the small unit 
leaders on the critical requirements.  Central to developing a push strategy is the need to 
understand how the innovation, the communication channel, time and the social structure 
affect the adoption of the innovation.  Being cognizant of these themes as tools are 
developed will maximize the impact on adoption.  The hypothesis of this thesis is that an 
effective information campaign will increase the adoption of DO.  The tool developed in 
this thesis was designed with these elements in mind, attempting to maximize the 
effectiveness of the tool on the process of adoption of the DO innovation.   
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V. REPRESENTING USMC COMPETENCIES IN CONCEPT 
MAPS 
This chapter of the thesis will introduce concept maps as a knowledge 
representation tool and the benefits of using concept maps.  The main reasons and 
motivation behind employing concept maps is discussed, and the key criteria that are 
found in good concept maps will be elaborated.  Next, the reasons why concept maps are 
a great tool for the propagation of the concept of distributed operations will be expressed. 
The process by which the requirements found in the major Marine Corps publications 
were expressed as concept maps for the thesis is detailed. Finally, the fact core mission 
areas from which the key Marine Corps conventional and DO specific skills were drawn 
will be summarized.     
A. CONCEPT MAPS 
As the domain of DO continues to take shape, there is now emerging a need to provide a 
common framework or context with which to represent, in a visual model, the 
fundamental critical skills necessary to enable distributed operations.  There now exists 
technology which enables this kind of a visual representation of domain knowledge in the 
form of a concept map.  The concept map is a tool which allows users to create 
hierarchical structures of concepts and relationships between those concepts.  The 
concept map is fundamentally a knowledge representation tool; it displays a specific 
label, usually a word or phrase, as one concept in a node or box.  There are then added 
lines showing linking words which then create a meaningful statement or proposition. 
These concepts are then arranged hierarchically with the most general concept at the top, 
and the most detailed at the bottom.  Propositions then become a statement about some 
object that shows a relationship between two or more concepts. There may also be cross-
links showing relationships between concepts in two different areas of the concept map.  
The concept map has a simple structure which consists of: 
• Concepts  
• Connections  
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• Linking phrases  
• Resources and how they can be linked to a concept  
Concepts are enclosed circles which include text.  Connections demonstrate the 
relationships between the concepts.  Linking phrases should consist of verbs, 
conjunctions, prepositions, and are not "concepts" themselves.  They contain the verbs 
which describe the relationships between the concepts.  Ideally, an intelligible English 
sentence can be formed by starting at a concept and continuing through a linking phrase 
to another concept.   
B. PURPOSE OF CONCEPT MAPS 
Concept maps in general serve five main purposes.  First, they can be used to 
increase the visibility of a particular domains knowledge sources, especially through use 
of intranets.  This in turn can facilitate the methods of locating key experience and 
expertise.  Secondly concept maps can increase the evaluation of “intellectual assets” 
(Eppler, 2001) for a given domain.  Next, concept maps often enable members of a 
domain to interpret and assess the information in the domain. Concept maps also make 
the vital connection from processes to source knowledge, and go beyond merely 
documenting a process.  Finally, they outline the essential steps for knowledge 
development in a particular domain. 
There are numerous common criteria that are found in all good concept maps that 
are essential for them to be used as a tool for gaining understanding of a particular 
domain (Eppler, 2001).  They are: 
• Information Rich – it masses together large amounts of information critical to 
the domain 
• Participative – the team creates the map interactively 
• Shared – all experts working off one understanding 
• Synergistic – different expertise combines to one common understanding 
• Simple – the map can be viewed and understood as a whole 
• Visual – illustrative icons represent information  
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Incorporating the essential common criteria into a concept map ensures it will be a viable 
tool for collaboration.  These characteristics are vital qualities in any attempt to gain 
usable knowledge of a particular domain.   
C. MILITARY APPLICATIONS 
Concept Maps have found success in a variety of civilian and military domains.  
The US Navy’s meteorology community has implemented concept maps to solve a 
number of challenging knowledge management problems.  A knowledge modeling effort 
to demonstrate the usefulness of representing local meteorological expertise was 
undertaken at the Naval Training Meteorological and Oceanography Facility (NTMOF) 
at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL (Hoffman, 2001).  A total of 26 concept 
maps were created covering such topics as the local climate, the effects of the Gulf of 
Mexico on the weather, fog, thunderstorms, hurricanes, and frontal passages.  The 
concept maps were found to be a highly useful, highly accessible learning resource.   
Many pre-existing resources were added to the model.  Resources and information from 
graphs and personal data, and links to helpful web sites were incorporated into the 
models.  Materials from the Local Forecaster’s Handbook were included.  A substantial 
amount of videos were created on various topics of interest and were added to the 
concept maps.  Over 400 additional information resources were added to the original 26 
concept maps.      
D. THE CONCEPT MAP SOFTWARE TOOLKIT 
In the past, concept map were drawn by hand. The process of iterating through 
many revisions of a concept map was time consuming. In the late 1980’s University of 
Florida in coordination with professors from the Florida Institute for Human and Machine 
Cognition (IHMC) began development of the software package that was used in this 
research.  The software quickly became the tool used for knowledge elicitation and was 
use widely as an explanatory tool for complex systems. The Institute used the tool to 
organize and navigate through large amounts of information via hyperlinks.  The latest 
version of the concept map tool can be downloaded for non profit use at: 
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http://cmap.ihmc.us. The software not only makes it easy for users to construct and 
modify concept maps in a similar way that a word processor makes it easy to write text, it 
also allows users to collaborate at a distance in the construction in their maps, publish 
their concept maps so anybody on the Internet can access them, link resources to their 
maps to further explain their contents, and search the world wide web for information 
related to the map.  All of these benefits made the CMAP program an obvious choice to 
represent DO domain knowledge.  
E. CONCEPT MAPS FOR CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Employing a concept map to identify, deduce, codify, and integrate information in 
the domain of DO meets two critical needs.  First the concept map can be used as a 
central repository to organize, collect and disseminate the information critical to DO as 
the information continues to evolve from debases, experimentation and implementation.  
Second, the concept map once amassed will be instrumental in making this collection of 
expertise accessible through a web based visual interface.  This process will be 
instrumental in accomplishing the much needed information campaign for DO.   
“Marines at all rank levels in the wider Corps community generally lack an 
understanding of what DO entails.  It is strongly asserted that a dedicated DO information 
campaign be instigated to push information to all areas of the Corps, especially schools, 
the operating force units, and staff who have an impact on the venture.”(SV-06 
Quicklook Report, 2006) 
1. FMFM-6-4 into Concept Maps 
In a recent Marine Corps Gazette article it was noted that “The basic building 
block of distributed operations is the rifle squad, augmented as necessary with mission 
essential specialists” (Schmidle, 2004).  This thesis therefore started with the most basic 
elements of the “basic building block of distributed operations” (Schmidle, 2004).  The 
logical initial starting point for the construction of a useful CMAP for the domain of 
distributed operations is the base knowledge contained in the FMFM 6-4 United States 
Marine Corps Manual.  The FMFM 6-4 Marine Rifle Company/Platoon manual puts 
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forth the doctrine, techniques and tactics employed by the Marines for operations and 
training conducted by Marine rifle companies and platoons.  It includes specifically 
information for the conduct of amphibious operations, helicopter-borne operations, 
offensive operations, offensive combat, defensive combat, patrolling, auxiliary 
operations, and finally counterinsurgency operations. 
As noted earlier from the review of the current publications on distributed 
operations, there is a pressing need for the enablement of the DO concept of operations to 
focus on the squad and team, small unit leaders.  It is at this critical level where much of 
the additional training will need to focus.  Operations such as call for fire which were 
previously handled by more senior level Marines will now fall on the capable solders of 
these small unit leaders.  Only by developing a training program which is tailored to 
enable the individual small unit leader to take independent tactical actions will the DO 
concept be enabled.  These are the key elements of the rifle company which will be called 
upon in a disaggregated formation to achieve essential tactical actions previously 
performed by members of the unit with more senior positions. 
The primary mission of the Marine Rifle Company and platoon is to locate, close 
with, and destroy the enemy.  The rifle company is the basic maneuver element of the 
infantry battalion and performs several core combat missions.   The development of the 
concept maps for the rifle platoon focused on two distinct levels, namely the squad level 
and the team level.  It is down to these two core levels where the most critical decision 
making authority will by pushed for the employment of distributed operations. As the DO 
Platoon leader of the 1/3 said upon his return from conducting distributed operation in 
Afghanistan “The Corporal Fire Team Leader can’t be a novice at all the skills in his fire 
team.  He needs to be able to teach them.  It should not be done several levels up the 
training echelon.  You want to do distributed operations down to the Fire Team level 
because there are situations where that’s certainly applicable, but then that Corporal 
needs to be brought up on the education level so he can not only demonstrate proficiency 
but also teach proficiency to the rest of his fire team and supervise that 
proficiency.”(Dotto, 2006) 
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At each level of focus, both squad and team, seven core capabilities are mapped 
out to facilitate the identification and training of the competencies necessary to eventually 
realize a DO capable unit.     These core competencies are offensive operations, defensive 
operations, amphibious operations, combat formations and signals, patrolling operations, 
and heliborne operations.  The core competencies were pulled directly from the FMFM 6-
4 manual for both the team and squad level.  Figures 3 and 4 show how each competency 
listed could be represented in a concept map with a link embedded in the node of an 
additional concept map, which can be selected and pulled up instantly.   
 
Figure 3.   Squad Concept Map (with links) 
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Figure 4.   Team Level Concept Map (with links)  
2. Squad and Team Core Capabilities and Competencies 
This section covers the actual concept maps that were created for the purpose of 
this thesis.  There are, as mentioned previously, seven major sections for the 
consideration of squad and team operations.  A short description of each of these sections 
with examples of the concept maps developed will be presented.  The sections which 
encompass the entirety of the core capabilities of the Marine Corps rifle unit are: 
• Amphibious Operations 
• Defensive Operations 
• Combat Operations 
• Combat Formations and Signals 
• Patrolling Operations 
• Techniques of Fire 
• Heliborne Operations 
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A quick overview of those core competencies and several examples of the concept maps 
are presented in Figures 5 – 8.  The presentations of the concept maps are a higher level 
presentation than the full presentations which were created for the purpose of the thesis.   
a. Amphibious Operations 
This section covers the amphibious operations as it applies to the rifle 
company.  The rifle company may often find itself employed in independent amphibious 
operations.  The amphibious operation is an offensive launch from naval vessels to secure 
a hostile shore.  As shown in Figure 5, these operations are conducted for the purpose of 
conducting future combat operations and obtaining an area from which to launch those 
efforts.  Amphibious operations employ sea, air, and land forces.  It is primarily 
concerned with massing troops and equipment, moving them to an objective area.  The 







Figure 5.   Team Amphibious Operations concept map 
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b. Offensive Operations 
The offensive operations include the techniques and basic principles used 
at the company and platoon level for gaining contact with the enemy and defeating him.  
The tactics and techniques capture in this map are those skill essential in the application 
of land combat.  Some of the key tactics, illustrated in Figure 6, include exploiting an 
enemy’s weakness, neutralizing an enemy’s capability to counter, tactics for gaining and 
maintaining momentum for attack, and providing security and integrity for the attacking 
force.  The general fundamentals of offensive tactics evolved as commanders applied the 
principles of war.  The application of these principles are what has shaped the current 
doctrine.  
 
Figure 6.   Squad Offensive Operations concept map 
c. Defensive Operations 
Figure 7 shows in defensive operations the tactics a rifle company 
employs in area and mobile defense.  The Marine rifle company may be required, in the 
conduct of amphibious operations or in operations ashore, to assume a defensive position.  
When a Marine unit ceases to move for any reason or for any period of time, it 
automatically assumes a defensive posture.  The unit may be employ defensive 
operations when ordered by a higher authority or when forced to by enemy action.  There 
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are two basic types of defensive positions, area defense and mobile defense.  The 
concepts articulated in this section discuss the roles of the rifle company and platoon 
within the framework of defensive operations.   
 
Figure 7.   Team Defensive Operations concept map 
d. Patrolling 
Figure 8 demonstrates the concept map detailing the skills necessary for 
maintaining security, gathering information, and engaging, harassing, or encountering an 
enemy.  It includes descriptions of the various roles employed in the effective use of 
patrolling as a part of combat operations.  The patrols are limited only by the skills and 
aggressiveness of the members of the patrol party.  Extensive and aggressive patrolling is 
one of the most effective information gathering tools the commander has at his disposal.   
The ability to conduct effective, aggressive patrolling operations is essential to the 
success of and Marine unit. 
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Figure 8.   Team Patrolling Operations concept map 
e. Counterinsurgency 
The counterinsurgency concept map includes information and tactics vital 
for the Marine unit to solve the challenges of an insurgent movement.  The tactics are 
presented in terms of U.S. forces countering an insurgent movement in a foreign nation.  
The tactics could as easily be applied to a domestic situation, the roles and 
responsibilities and the tactics remain the same.   Counter-insurgency is normally 
conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as 
propaganda, psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many 
different facets and actions taken to defeat insurgency by the military. 
f. Auxiliary Operations 
The auxiliary operation concept map captures are combat related skills 
that aid the well-structured operation of defensive or offensive operations.  The skills 
delineated in this map are essential to the success of a unit operating in a combat zone.  
The tactics included in this concept map fall under the following areas:  
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• Relief operations 
• Reconnaissance in force 
• Retrograde operations 
• Mine Warfare 
• Nuclear; biological, and chemical defense 
3. Addition of DO Specific Skills 
It is important to remember that DO is defined as an additive capability 
(Goulding, 2005).  None of the additional critical capabilities will replace existing 
requirements.  The Marine Corps must continue to train the basic core competencies and 
additionally identify and train DO specific emerging competencies.  With the current 
OPTEMPO experienced by the Marines as the Corps finds itself engaged in two conflicts, 
training time will continue to be sparse.  The training time given to master these skills 
will not decrease.  As it was pointed out earlier, a major enabler for the realization of the 
DO concept is not just the incorporation of the new emerging DO specific competencies, 
but the mastery of the conventional skills which are currently taught for proficiency, not 
mastery.  The literature currently available on DO calls for small unit Marines to become 
“brilliant at the basics” which implies not a proficiency of the core conventional 
competencies, but a much higher level of skill proficiency.    
The skills required for conventional operations were first entered into the concept 
maps.  The next step was to search publications and reports issued after MCWL experiments 
to attempt to identify and add the emerging DO specific skills.  These skills were entered into 
the concept maps and the nodes were specially color coded for easy identification. 
This chapter provided a rationale for choosing concept maps to express the critical 
requirements for the Marine Corps Rifle Unit.  The concept knowledge representation tool is 
tailor made for the type of concurrent development adopted by the developers of the DO 
concept of operations.  The major common criteria which are found in all effective concept 
maps were discussed, along with the main reference used to formulate the concept maps 
employed in this thesis.  The need to focus the concept maps on the squad and team levels 
was stated and sever high level examples of the concept maps were illustrated. 
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VI. VIRTUAL TRAINING SIMULATIONS 
This chapter covers the use of virtual training simulation for military purposes.  A 
discussion of several guiding principles for employing virtual training simulations is put 
forward.  The use of concept maps as a knowledge representation tool for information 
about various virtual training simulations is explained.  The essential questions used to 
gather the information are delineated.  An example of the information gathered for the 
formulation of the concept map is given.   
A. VIRTUAL TRAINING SIMULATIONS AS A SUPPLEMENT 
Virtual Environment (VE) technology has emerged as one of the most promising 
new training tools. The flexibility offered by virtual training simulations allows training 
in a wide variety of environments and situations which are too complex, risky or 
expensive for live training.  Virtual training simulations allow for very specific scenarios 
to be practiced as needed.  This chapter will discuss some essential considerations for 
employing virtual training simulation for military applications.  The primacy of real 
training over virtual training simulations will be asserted.  There role that simulations can 
play to complement real training is discussed.  An example of a virtual training 
simulation and the key features of the simulation which are important to know in order to 
employ the simulation will be demonstrated.     
The military has long sought after simulation capabilities that will allow units to 
train effectively even if they do not have an opportunity to participate in high fidelity 
field training exercises.  There is also a critical need for units and military schoolhouses 
to conduct effective mission rehearsal that prepare for various combat missions in various 
terrains.  VE technologies have the potential to provide training and mission rehearsal.  In 
response to those needs all branches of the military have sought to find critical 
technologies that can do a variety of military training needs such as simulate locomotion, 
track weapons and body position, create realistic terrain environments, and creating 
simulation that covered emergency procedures which could not be otherwise trained (Bell 
& Waag, 1998).   
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One of the areas where virtual reality has found practical application is in the 
domain of military training.  From flight simulations, to game based trainers, to full 
bridge ship handling simulations, the military is employing simulation to immerse its 
members into scenario driven events to teach and evaluate their knowledge regarding 
certain tactics.  Desktop simulations and digital game-based technologies such as Close 
Combat Marine, have earned much attention for their potential as training interventions 
(Baxter, 2004). The USMC is leveraging aspects of digital-game based methods and 
inserting them into tactical decision-making simulations.  The military is focusing a great 
deal of effort on developing virtual world technologies that will allow training combat 
skills in flight simulators (Bell, 1998).  As simulator technology has improved, the scope 
of simulator-based training has expanded. Today, simulator-based training for military 
flight includes emergency procedures, basic system use, and transition flight.  
When dealing with virtual training simulations, there are some essential guiding 
principles to hold fast to.  It is important to remember that virtual simulation trainers are 
only a tool and that other elements of training setups are still needed (Sadagic, 2007).  In 
most of the training situation they are considered as part of a set of potential aids to the 
training problem.   Virtual training simulations are often used not as a replacement for 
current training tactics but as a supplement to current training tactics.  A simulation will 
always be just that; a simulation, and it can seldom completely replace the experiences of 
real field exercises.  Finally, simulations should be employed when there is evidence that 
they provide the better solution to a particular training need (Sadagic, 2007).  The 
simulation might be the best approach for solving one particular training need, this does 
not instantly make it the one size solution to all training problems.     
As alluded to in the previous paragraph, virtual training simulations are 
increasingly being demonstrated as effective tools to supplement the training needs of 
military units.  Simulations are gaining widespread acceptance because they meet some 
essential needs of the military.  First they have a potential to preserve precious resources 
and gain cost savings wherever possible.  Once the initial cost for a simulation system is 
incurred, there is little expenses left like those normally encountered with live training 
systems.  With simulations there are no expenditures for such things as ammunition, 
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logistical support, fuel, equipment, transportation, and weapons.  Second, employing 
simulations in training provides the users with increased flexibility.  In the ever 
increasing OPTEMPO faced by today’s units, finding extra time to train is rare.  
Simulations can be quickly loaded with various libraries to facilitate training in a number 
of environments and terrains.  Adding a new scenario is often a matter of loading a new 
library rather than restructuring an entire trainer.   
As the critical training requirements continue to emerge from the concurrent 
development of DO, the number of new skills required to be train quickly also increases.  
It is important to remember that DO is an additive capability.  Units are going to be 
required to master the DO essential skills in addition to the emerging DO skills.  Any 
advantage offered by simulation to supplement live training must be capitalized on. Next, 
the use of virtual training simulations can facilitate the initial procedural training and 
necessary refresher training critical for maintaining a high degree of readiness.  
Simulations often have the effect of increasing the motivation of users to employ these 
systems and learn tactics.  The ability of some simulation to have the look and feel of 
video games makes easier for the gamer generation to learn.     
The military is investing a great amount of resources into acquiring and 
implementing virtual training simulations.  While the military continues to invest large 
resources in procuring these systems, the rate at which the virtual training systems are 
being adopted by potential users is very slow.  There appears to be a lack of serious 
diffusion of simulation training to the masses of military units.  The pressing need is to 
develop tools which facilitate the adopting of the DO innovation by the largest 
percentage of users.  Understanding how can the military encourage and enable the 
masses of military units to embrace the evolving DO concept will significantly shape the 
tools that are developed for that employ.   The primary focus of this thesis is on 
developing the best tools to enable and encourage the majority of DO adopters to 
understand the DO concept and to embrace and employ the virtual simulation technology 
to train the critical DO skills.    
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B. CONCEPT MAPS FOR VIRTUAL TRAINING SIMULATIONS 
In order to best propagate the DO concept and to link users to virtual training 
simulation it was necessary to develop a basic user friendly tool.  For the purpose of 
developing this tool, a list was generated of the best available virtual training simulations 
which are employed throughout the military for the specific training of the skills 
identified as essential for both conventional operations and distributed operations.  
Experts from MCWL and TECOM, well versed in both conventional operations and the 
DO concept, were queried and they provided inputs for the set of virtual training 
simulations most frequently used by USMC units.  Once those core simulations were 
identified, a list of supplementary information necessary for the efficient use of these 
simulations was compiled.  Included in this list are such information as: 
1. General summary of the simulation. 
2. What websites are available that provides additional information on the 
simulation? 
3. What are the critical skills (conventional/DO specific) the system is 
designed to train? 
4. What can the system simulate? 
5. What is the number of personnel the training system is able to train? 
6. Are there different proficiency levels the simulation is designed to train? 
7. Is there a downloadable version of the training simulation? 
8. What are the hardware requirements? 
9. What are the software requirements? 
10. Is there any technical support available for the simulation? 
11. Is there any instructor support needed/ available? 
12. Is there a library of scenarios available for use? 
13. Where are these simulations currently being employed?  
14. What manuals/research papers are available on using this simulation? 





The list gathered was by no means exhaustive.  The main goal was a first an attempt to 
build a tool which is robust enough to be updated and shaped later by being reviewed by 
subject matter experts.  In other words, the idea is to build a framework into which can be 
brought expert knowledge. 
In a manner similar to the transitioning of tactics from the FMFM 6-4 manual for 
the team and squad level, the collection of virtual training simulation was transitioned 
into a concept map.  This was accomplished for all fourteen of the major training 
simulations.  An example of one such concept map is presented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.   Training Set Fire Observation 
Once the list of virtual training simulations was gathered, and the best supporting 
information was gathered, the information was compiled into a corresponding concept 
map for each virtual training simulation.  The gathering of these concept maps created a 
database from which to compare and match critical skills which need to be trained for 
both conventional skills and DO skills.  There are two bodies of information available to 
search, one containing conventional skills derived from Marine Corps manuals and DO 
skills from literature, and a second body of information with currently available virtual 
training simulations and the essential supplemental information about them. 
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C. AN EXAMPLE: FORWARD OBSERVER PC SIMULATOR 
The following is an example for the Forward Observer PC Simulator of the 
supplemental information which was gathered to assist users in implementing virtual 
training simulation to supplement their real time training requirements.  For each virtual 
training simulation various categories were considered and information gathered.    
 
Figure 10.   Forward Observer PC Simulator 2 (Figure taken from 
www.29palms.usmc.mil) 
1. Summary 
FOPCSIM is a Call for Fire Simulator that was developed by Marines at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.  FOPCSIM allows users to conduct 
call for fire training on simulated Twentynine Palms terrain.  FOPCSIM is a procedural 
trainer for artillery and mortar Call for Fire that provides scoring and feedback on the 
standards of performance prescribed in the training and Readiness Manuals for observed 
fire.  FOPCSIM uses a 3D visual representation of real world terrain and an interface to 
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provide a training environment for doctrinal Call for Fire procedures.  Each mission is 
scored based on the Ft. Sill Observed Fire grading standard.  FOPCSIM has realistic 
enemy targets which the user must correctly identify and then determine the correct 
munitions to engage it with. 
This is a PC based first person perspective call for fire Artillery simulation.  It can 
be used in a distributed networked or in a stand alone mode.   FOPCSIM is designed to 
allow Marines of all skill levels to develop and practice their call for fire skills on a 
variety of targets (both stationary and mobile).  It can provide doctrinal feedback on calls 
made, and help novices correct errors.  User settings can be easily adjusted to create more 
challenging missions so that students remain challenged as their skill level increases.  
FOPCSIM is part of the Deployed Virtual Training Environment (DVTE) suite of 
simulations. 
2. Web Links 
 Downloadable version: http://www.army.mil/ako/ 
 Downloadable version also at www.fopcsimmarines.com 
3. Skills Simulation is Designed to Train 
 Call for Fire missions 
 Combined Arms 
• Conduct a call for fire using Polar, grid, and Shift from a 
known point 
• Conduct fire support team operations 
4. What can the system simulate? 
  <Information needed>. 
5. Single/Multi User 
 Multiple modes: Individual player, Classroom mode, Networked Mode 
6. Downloadable Version 
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 Open Source using Delta 3D  
 Unlimited Distribution- featured on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Fires 
knowledge Network 
7. Proficiency Levels  
<Information needed>. 
8. Hardware  
 1 GHz CPU (Pentium 4 or Athlon) 
 DirectX 8.1 capable video card with 64 MB video RAM 
 1 GB free disk space 
256 MB RAM 
9. Software requirements 
 <Information needed> 
10. Technical Support  
Technical support is available through contact with Twentynine palms.   
11. Instructor Support 
http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/dirs/ont/mands/fopcsim.asp 
This site is the homepage of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at the 
Marine Air Ground Force Training Command.    
12. Library of Scenarios 
 Fully customizable scenario via XML 
13. Simulation Centers Currently Employing System 
 The Basic School, Quantico, VA 
 FOPCSim replaced TSFO for Squad Leader’s Course 
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14. Research Papers/Manuals 
 Naval Postgraduate School thesis (McDonough and Strom, 2005) 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA439644  
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VII. DEVELOPMENT OF SEARCH TOOL 
This chapter discusses the development of the search tool to allow users to link 
critical conventional and DO specific skills identified in the tactics database with the 
virtual training simulations which can train those skills.  The process of converting the 
concept maps into an XML format is covered along with the general structure of the 
XML code.  The XML files, once converted, had several issues and limitations detailed 
in the text.  The basic use of the tool is discussed including some of the considerations 
which went into the choice of the tool development.     
A. CMAPS INTO XML 
Transitioning the concept maps into XML files is a simple process that is built 
into the CMAP program itself.  Once the knowledge of a certain domain is captured in 
the concept maps the user can simply under the file menu choose the “export file as” 
option and then choose the “XML” option.  A .cxl file is generated which has a fairly 
basic structure (see Appendix A).   
There are some limitations which could present problems for the users of the 
maps as an effective diffusion tool.  The following limitations have been perceived, for 
instance, if a search is performed for a specific training skill, say call for fire, the search 
will return the title of the concept map which the user can then access and search.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, a more robust functionality is desired.  As mentioned earlier the 
CMAP tool allows users to export the concept map as an xml file, but this process is not 
perfect as some of the text contained in the nodes becomes scrambled in the XML file.  
Any special characters contained in the nodes of the original concept map enter into the 
XML code as special characters.  For the purpose of the thesis, and for general usability, 
it was necessary to go in by hand and correct all the places in the code where the special 
character code manifested itself.      
The next step in the development of an effective search tool was to create a 
database of all the concept maps for both the team and squad levels for the eight essential 
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mission areas covered by the FMFM 6-4.  Once all of the concept map files were 
exported as .cxl files and the special characters were deleted from the XML code, a data 
base of tactics now exited which an end user could use to search for certain conventional 
and DO related skills.  Next, all of the concept maps which contained information on the 
fourteen virtual training simulations were converted to XML and gathered into a common 
database.  A database from which to match critical DO and conventional skills to 
corresponding virtual training simulations was created.    
B. GRAPHIC USER INTERFACE    
In order to develop an effective search tool, there was a need to build an 
application that conducts an efficient search between these two databases.  In order to 
provide desired functionality, the attention was focused on designing a GUI to search and 
return search results between the two databases.  As demonstrated in Figure 11, the main 
screen of the application contains three panels.  They are:  
• Search for Tactics 




Figure 11.   Graphic User Interface 
C. SEARCH CAPABILITIES 
The GUI interface is based on JAVA Foundation Classes Swing GUI.  Using the 
JFC and Swing allow the GUI to incorporate the features such as drop down lists, 
buttons, text areas, and built in menu capabilities.  The code consists of four main classes; 
the classes correspond to the windows which the user will interact with in the GUI 
(AboutForm, MainForm, OptionsForm, and ViewForm).  These classes contain all the 
necessary functionality and presentation for the corresponding window. 
The main advantage of employing the JFC Swing GUI is its ability to graphically 
construct the components of the GUI by dragging and dropping the desired features in the 
GUI.  Netbeans integrated development environment (IDE) generates the necessary code 
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for the message processing in the GUI.  The classes in the code consist of two types of 
methods.  One is from the built in framework of the event driven procedures in the GUI, 
for example a selection from the drop down list.  The others are the functions which are 
created by the designer of the GUI to add supported functionality to the application.   
The development of the search function could have been conducted between the 
databases in two main ways.  The first method would have involved using XSLT in a 
program such as ALTOVA XML SPY to extract the data, and the second method which 
could have been employed would be a JAVA application.  For the thesis, the JAVA 
application was chosen to provide the necessary search feature for the following reasons: 
• The XML that is generated by the CMAP has a complex structure.  Creating 
an XSTL that would extract the data is not a trivial problem.   
• Java is a more universal language, and is more flexible to manipulate data 
structures.   
• Java is better suited for the development of GUI applications.   
• By creating the application with JAVA, future enhancements can more easily 
be employed onto various data sources.  
The process of exporting the concept maps into xml was relatively simple to 
accomplish.  The program exports an xml file which can be imported into any one of a 
number of integrated development environments.  For the purpose of the thesis work, 
XML spy was not chosen due to the difficulty in implementing an effective search 
functionality.  Employing a JAVA based IED allowed for the development of a much 
more robust GUI.   
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Figure 12.   Graphic User Interface Drop Down Menu 
As illustrated in Figure 12, the search for tactics section contains a drop down 
menu.  This menu contains predefined tactics or the end user can customize his search 
criteria.  The drop down can easily be customized to give the user a sampling of useful 
tactics to be searched.  The squad/team mission area represents the list of mission areas 
which contain the searched tactics.  The simulation section displays the names of the 
simulation that have training capabilities for the searched tactics. 
There are several steps to proceed through when using this tool.  First, as seen in 
Figure 12, in the search for tactics area the user can either choose from predefined tactics, 
or the user can add his/her own text for alternative searches.  The automatic drop down 
menu’s predefined tactics were added to enhance the usability for Marines who are not 
familiar with specific conventional or DO related tactics and to make this input easier and 
faster.  The user conducts the search by simple selecting the “search for tactics” button.  
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As illustrated in Figure 13, if a drop down menu item is selected then the GUI will return 
one of eight mission essential areas for either team or squad. 
   
Figure 13.   Mission Areas found from Forward Observer Search 
On the other hand, if user conducts a customized search that GUI may return 
either one of eight mission areas or a message identifying that the concept was not found 
in the database.  For each concept that is returned, as in Figure 13, the user can select 
“search for simulations” which will start the search of the simulations database for all 
simulation containing capabilities to train the searched tactics.  If a simulation is found, 
as in Figure 14, the user can then extract more detailed information on that specific 




Figure 14.   List of Simulations returned from search of Team Techniques of Fire 
The user at any time can view the entire concept map of either the Squad/Team 
mission area or the simulations by selecting either the View Tactics Cmap or View 
Simulations Cmap.  The data associated with the concept maps are stored on a server, and 
they will appear as a web page that illustrates the structure of a given concept map.  All 
links attached to the web page concept map are interactive and can take the user to web 
documents or manuals associated with a particular simulation.     
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VIII. FUTURE WORK 
There are several issues identified for future work. 
1. For the purpose of this thesis SME input was sought at every step of the 
development.  The author received help and guidance from individuals 
who are playing key roles in the development of the concept of DO.  
Personnel from TECOM and MCWL offered information and inputs at 
several key junctures of the development of the CMAP tool.  What is 
lacking though is a thorough review and validation of the tool.  A logical 
next step would be to have Marine Corp SME on the subject of DO review 
the accuracy of the information gathered.  This information will continue 
to be shaped by the development of the DO concept itself.  Therefore, a 
periodic review as the concept concurrently develops is needed to update 
this tool and make it useful and relevant for the end users.   
2. The next logical extension of the tool would be to conduct a study where a 
group of users could use the tool to examine the degree to which the use of 
this tool contributes to an effective information campaign (another group 
of users, a control group, would not have access to this tool).  It is vitally 
important to design and conduct experiments to see if the tool played an 
effective role in the dissemination of the concept of DO, especially to the 
small group leaders who are invaluable to the accomplishment of DO.  
Such a study would be longitudinal in its nature, and therefore it would not 
be feasible to be part of this thesis work.   
3. In the development of the GUI interface that connects and provides the 
search capability for the thesis, it was noted that new search capabilities 
could be added to identify the skill areas where no virtual training 
simulations that train those skills currently exist.  As the virtual training 
simulation database gets continuously updated and the critical DO skills 
identified and added, an end user would have accurate information on 
what set of skills are still not supported by the existing simulations.   
It is strongly hoped that future students in the MOVES and HSI departments will take 
this work and continue to develop and shape the communication tool developed here.  
Only by seriously analyzing the usability of the tool and getting subject matter experts 
oversight on the tool will it become an affective medium of propagation of the DO 
concept.  Linking the end users to the set of virtual training simulation currently available 
would increase their awareness about those simulations and consequently it would 
increase their use and training effectiveness.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The need for the Marine Corps to develop and implement a formalized DO 
concept is pressing.  The Operational commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have made 
clear that there is a requirement for a capability to distribute the force when it is to its 
tactical advantage to do so. In order for the Marine Corp to successfully implement the 
DO concept, clearly there is a requirement for a significant increase in the level of 
education and training given to the individual Marine. It has been strongly recommended 
both by USMC leadership and from interviewed small unit leaders that a dedicated DO 
information campaign should be instigated to push information to all areas of the Marine 
Corps. 
The work on this thesis included a number of steps focused on creating an 
effective web based collaborative tool. This particular tool is designed with the intention 
to be used by DO SME’s and end users with the goal to increase their understanding of 
both conventional and DO skills as well as a range of virtual training simulations that can 
be used to train those skills.  The hope is that this effort will be a valuable contribution 
towards a much needed information campaign to educate all Marines. 
It is hoped that this initial attempt at identifying and understanding the issues 
related to the real world problem, and the design of a communication tool will be carried 
on.   Only when focused, proactive information campaign for the entire USMC 
community is undertaken, the adoption of the DO innovation will be successful.  A 
successful information campaign will enable all Marines up and down the chain of 
command to comprehend the DO concept, and it will provide small unit leaders with a 
broader understanding of the requisite knowledge and novel training opportunities that 
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APPENDIX A:  XML STRUCTURE OF CMAPS  
This appendix contains the construct used for converting the concept maps into an 
XML format.  This same construct is used for all of the files for both the tactics database 
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APPENDIX B:  CURRENT VIRTUAL TRAINING SIMULATIONS  
This appendix contains the information gathered for three virtual training 
simulations currently used by the USMC.  Note that the given simulations are only 
illustrations of the complete data set collected and represented in the concept maps and 
the tool.  The full set consists of information about the following virtual training 
simulations: 
• Guard Unit Armory Device Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer 
(GUARDFIST II) 
• Call-For-Fire Trainer 
• Indoor Simulated Marksmanship Trainer-Enhanced (ISMT-E) 
• Forward Observer Training System (FOTS) 
• Forward Observer PC Simulator 2 (FOPCSIM 2) 
• DOTTS 10 
• Close Combat Marine (CCM) 
• Virtual Battlespace (VBS-1&2) 
• Tactical Iraqi 
• Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer-Marine (VCCT-M) 
• Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIM) 
• FOCUSS 2 
This information was transferred into concept maps and use to establish a 
database of simulation to which the GUI matched various tactics.    
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A. CLOSE COMBAT MARINE (CCM) 
 
Figure 15.   Close Combat Marine (Figure taken from www.closecombatseries.net) 
1. Summary 
Close Combat Marine is a real-time strategy tactical decision making simulation 
which is published by Atomic Games. The focus of the computer combat simulation is on 
infantry combat at the small-unit level.  The game teaches Non-commissioned Officers 
(NCOs), Staff NCOs, and junior officers multiple tactics on a virtual battlefield.  The 
simulation can be played against the computer Artificial Intelligence, head to head or in a 
multiplayer mode with up to three players on each side.  The game was designed to be a 
supplement to regular field exercises by allowing enabling instructors to create the 
scenarios which trainees need most.   
2. Web Links 
Close Combat Marine Blog and download page: 
http://www.closecombat.org/forums/showthread.php?t=6254 




3. Skills Simulation is Designed to Train 
Combat Actions 
 Participate in realistic rehearsals 
 Collect and report information 
 Conduct a debrief 
 Issue an order 
 Navigate using current maps and imagery with or without the aid of GPS 
 Employing guardian angel 
Combined Arms 
 Plan and execute Close Air Support 
 Plan and execute a Fire support Plan 
 Conduct Fire and movement 
 Knock out a bunker 
 Conduct tank-infantry attack 
 Conduct a supported attack of fortified position 
 Plan, integrate and employ combined arms 
 Attack a fortified position 
Cultural Training 
First Aid/ CASEVAC 
IED Defeat 
Entry Control Point/Vehicle Check Point 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
 Move through a built up area 
 Attack a building 
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 Conduct an urban Attack 
 Conduct urban fire support 
Conduct urban defense 
Motorized Operations 
 Conduct a convoy 
 Take immediate action against unblocked ambush during a convoy 
 Employ vehicles in support of dismounted operations 
 Plan and conduct convoy operations 
 Conduct a motorized movement to contact 
 Conduct route clearance 
The simulation can be employed to train Marines on numerous tactics such as: 
Infantry Defense 
Support by Fire Tactics  
Assault/Defense in Urban Terrain   
Mortar Tactics 
Anti-Tank Tactics 
4. What can the system simulate? 
  <Information needed> 
5. Single/Multi User 
Single player/ Multi Player 
6. Downloadable Version 
 CD ROM availability  
7. Proficiency Levels 
 <Information needed> 
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8. Hardware  
Basic Computer system, keyboard Mouse, speakers.  Computers must have 
networking capability 
9. Software requirements 
Different releases Version 3.1 was released via the Marine Corps Gazette.  
Version 4.0 was released in September of 2005 and the latest version (v5.1) was released 
soon after.  In November 2007, Matrix games released “Close Combat: Modern Tactics 
for commercial purposes. 
10. Technical Support  
 <Information needed> 
11. Instructor Support 
<Information needed> 
12. Library of Scenarios 
<Information needed> 
13. Simulation Centers Currently Employing System 
<Information needed>    
14. Research Papers/Manuals 
<Information needed> 
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B. VIRTUAL BATTLESPACE (VBS) 
 
Figure 16.   Virtual Battlespace 2 (Figure taken from www.virtualbattlespace.com)  
1. Summary 
VBS2 is the next generation tactical simulation that is in the process of replacing 
VBS1.  VBS2 is a personal computer based “First Person” system with a mission 
rehearsal capability.  The system employs fully configurable virtual battlefield and can 
simulate all MAGTF platforms and weapons.  See Figure 11 for screen shots of this 
simulation.  The system is extremely flexible and can create numerous scenarios that are 
tailored to the specific training requirements of any unit.  Training system is robust 
enough to engage up to 100 Marines in a single scenario to train various tactics, 
techniques, and procedures.  Marines are able to train in a number of challenging 
environments and the level of opposition can be manipulated to meet the unit’s 
proficiency level.  Marines can act as a single unit against a simulated OPFOR or the 
training unit can be divided into two groups which compete against one another.  Both 
VBS1 and VBS2 are part of the suite of application which comprises DVTE. 
2. Web Links 
The home page for everything related to Virtual Battlespace 1: 
http://www.virtualbattlespace.com/ 
The home page for everything related to Virtual Battlespace 2: 
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http://virtualbattlespace.vbs2.com/ 
3. Skills Simulation is Designed to Train 
Enduring Combat Actions 
Conduct 5 and 25 meter checks 
Execute EOF procedures 
Apply rules of engagement in operations 
Conduct realistic rehearsal 
Conduct a brief 
Issue an order 
Collection and report information 
Navigate using  
Conduct tactical questioning 
Gather evidence 
Employ Guardian Angel 
Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
Searching a building/dwelling 
Clear a building 
Conduct urban fire support 
Conduct urban defense 
Conduct urban Attack 
React to contact with ambush, sniper, and IED 
Conduct (4) man entry, (4) man clear 
Clear a stairwell 
Employ Grenades in MOUT 
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Move through a built up area 
Motorized Operations  
Conduct a convoy 
Take immediate action against blocked ambush during a convoy 
Defend against mines/booby traps (IEDs) 
Conduct Vehicle Recovery 
Establish and execute a bump plan 
Take immediate action against Sniper(s) 
Execute turret (5 hole) actions 
Conduct a motorized movement to contact 
Conduct route clearance 
Employ vehicles in support of dismounted operations  
 Entry Control Point/Vehicle Check Point 
  Conduct deliberate VCP/ECP 
  Conduct Hasty VCP 
  Establish a snap VCP 
 First Aid/CASEVAC 
  Establish and operate casualty collection point 
  Conduct a CASEVAC 
  Plan, brief and rehearse CASEVAC 
  Establish and operate a Casualty Collection point 
  Conduct LZ operations 
 IED Defeat 
  Conduct IED Hunting Ops 
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  Conduct Ops to defeat IED system predict; prevent; detect; 
neutralize, mitigate  
  React to a possible ground emplaced IED 
  Prepare for a VBIED or suicide bomber attack 
4. What the System Can Simulate 
Opposing forces via the mission editor 
Opposing forces can be live or AI 
AI advanced semi-automated forces to simulate military behavior 
Observer module 
Addon Terrain Pack 
Core Island Pack 
Vehicles: A-10, AH-1, CH-47, UH-60, M1A1, 5-ton Truck, HMMWV   
Weapons: M16, M4, M249, M24, MP5, M9 Beretta, LAW, Carl Gustav, Stinger 
Weapons: Hand grenades, Smoke grenades, Satchel charges, AT Mines, Flares, 
Binoculars, Night vision goggles 
5. Single/Multi User 
Single player downloadable version 
Multi-user 
The multi-user capability works with up to 32+ total users with no degradation in 
performance and can be operated in either a standalone mode/ or across a LAN or 
Internet. 
VBS can take the form of many different combat scenarios and environments, 
which can immerse between one and one hundred Marines into a virtual world where 
small-unit leaders can test their SOP and conduct rehearsals.  
6. Proficiency Levels 
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<Information needed> 
7. Downloadable Version 
A special license version of VBS is available to Marines for personal use.  It is a 
single player version that may be used to design and save multiplayer scenarios which 
can be saved to a thumb drive and taken to the Battle Simulation Center for multiplayer 
use.    
http://www.torrentreactor.net/torrents/929584/Virtual-Battlespace-1-0-(reseed) 
8. Hardware  
VBS2 Minimum System Requirements 
CPU : 
Intel : Pentium D 2.5 GHZ 
AMD :Athlon 64 2.5 GHZ 
OS : 
Windows XP 32-Bit Service Pack 2 
Windows Vista 32-Bit Release 
RAM : 
1 GB 
Hard Drive Space : 
8 GB Removable Disk : 
(Optional, for installation only) 
DVD, Dual-Layer  
Video Specifications:  
Shader Model : 3 
Video Memory : 256MB 
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Hardware DirectX : 9.0c Software DirectX : 9.0c 
Display Resolution : 800x600 
USB : One port free required for HASP-based license key 
Network : (Optional, for network sessions) 100mbit LAN 54Mbit 802.11g 
Audio System : (Optional) 
OpenAL 1.2 compatible 
9.  Software requirements 
<Information needed> 
10. Technical Support 
Requests for training support william.yates@usmc.mil 
11. Instructor Support 
Assistance in developing scenarios is available from the Battle Simulation Staff. 
12. Library of Scenarios 
Scenarios can be developed by Platoon Commanders, Squad Leaders, and 
Fireteam Leaders to design training scenarios to meet specific training objectives for their 
unit’s needs, stored to thumb drives and loaded at the simulation center.  There are a 
variety of predefined scenarios already available for all purposes of training.   
13. Simulation Centers Currently Employing System 
Twentynine Palms 
14. Research Papers/Manuals 
User's Handbook provides the techniques and procedures for in-scenario 




C. TACTICAL IRAQI 
 
Figure 17.   Tactical Iraqi (Figure taken from www.wired.com) 
1. Summary 
Tactical Iraqi Language and Cultural Trainer (TILCT) is a simulation that is 
designed to teach individual Marines the basics of the Iraqi Arabic language along with 
some experience understanding different cultural nuances of Iraqi life.  It is a PC based 
trainer which is designed to develop proficiency with the Arabic language and culture. 
The simulation uses a mixture of skill building lessons and practice missions.  It is 
capable of training various skill levels and employs a voice recognition system to 
facilitate practicing speaking.  Tactical Iraqi is currently being used at the Battle 
Simulation Center and the Learning Resource Center.  The simulation center also offers 
Afghanistan and Tactical French (for use in Africa) and the system is a part of the 
Deployed Virtual Training Environment (DVTE) suite of simulations. 
2. Web Links 
 Essential web link to current information for the employment of Tactical Iraqi: 
www.tacticallanguage.com 
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This site is the homepage of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at the 
Marine Air Ground Force Training Command.    
http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/dirs/ont/mands/tlts.asp 
3. Skills Simulation is Designed to Train 
Practice language proficiencies in virtual conversations in order to meet mission 
objectives. 
4. What the System Can Simulate 
Virtual civilians 
AI entities to carry on simulations and conversations 
Phonetic pronunciations of language builder vocabulary 
5. Single/Multi User 
Single user, desktop application 
6. Proficiency Levels 
Skill builder format exists which includes hearing the spoken word by a native 
speaker, phonetic pronunciation. 
7. Downloadable Version 
The software is available for download and may be installed on personally owned 
computers that meet the hardware requirements.  To download a copy of software one 
must register at the www.tacticallanguage.com website and provide an military email 
address to access the installation program. 
8. Hardware  
1 GB RAM 
2 GHz CPU 





Speech recognition software 
Tactical language software (downloadable format) 
10. Technical Support 
http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/dirs/ont/mands/tlts.asp 
11. Instructor Support 
None needed 
12. Library of Scenarios 
Various Scenarios: Tactical Iraqi is divided into three parts: lessons; arcade 
games; and a mission/game mode. The vocabulary and culture tutor listens to students' 
utterances and applies speech-recognition technology to assess progress. Students may 
also navigate through a set of arcade games by speaking Arabic commands, including 
directions (such as left, right, north, south, and toward the river), along with place names, 
color names, and military rank. The more complicated the utterance, the more points the 
game awards. In listening modes, trainees respond to computer-delivered Arabic 
commands. 
13. Simulation Centers Currently Employing System 
 Twentynine Palms  
14. Research Papers/Manuals 
Brochure: Tactical Language & Culture Training System: 
http://support.tacticallanguage.com/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_vi
ew&gid=33&Itemid=74 
In Country with Tactical Iraqi: Trust, Identity, and Language Learning in a 
Military Video Game.  Article by: Elizabeth Losh 
https://eee.uci.edu/faculty/losh/virtualpolitik/DAC2005.pdf 
 71
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Amos, James F, LtGen, USMC, (2005, Jan.) Marine Corps Operations in Complex and 
Distributed Environments, Marine Corps Gazette, 87, p. 22-30. 
Baxter, Holly C., Ross, Karol G., Phillips, Jennifer, Shafer, Jennifer, Fowlkes, Jennifer.  
(2004). Leveraging Commercial Video Game Technology to Improve Military 
Decision Skills.  Inter-service/ Industry Training, Simulation, and Education 
Conference (I/ITSEC) 2004. 
Bell, H.H. and Waag, W.L., Evaluating the effectiveness of flight simulators for training 
combat skills: A review, International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 1998 
Distributed Operations in Afghanistan, Third Marines, Marine Corps Center for Lessons 
Learned Observations and Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) VI 
(Nov, 2006). 
Dotto, Peter Senior Analyst MCCLL, (2006, July). Interview with 1st Lt Carl DeSantis, 
Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon “DO Platoon” B Company, 1/3. 
Eppler, M. (2001). Making Knowledge Visible through Intranet Knowledge Maps: 
Concepts, Elements, Cases. 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences, Volume 4, p. 403. 
Erdie, Philip B., (2005, Dec.). The Implications of Distributed Operations. Marine Corps 
Gazette, 89, p. 12-22. 
Goulding, Vincent J. (2006). Just Do It. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 55 
p.214-223. 
Goulding, Vincent J., (2005, April). Distributed Operations. Marine Corps Gazette, 89, p. 
45-55. 
Hagee, M. W. General USMC. “A Concept for Distributed Operations” Department of 
the Navy. April 2005. 
Hanlon, Jr. Edward.  LtCol, USMC, (2004, July). Distributed Operations: The Time Is 
Now. Marine Corps Gazette, 62, p.45-59.  
Hoffman, R.R., Coffey, J.W., Ford, K.M. & Carnot, M.J., SROTM-LK: A human\-
centered knowledge model for weather forecasting. Proc. 45th Annual Meeting of 
the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Minneapolis, MN, USA, 2001. 
Penn, P. S., Col, USMC, (2006, Nov.). Quicklook Report for the SV-06 Advanced 




Schmidle, Robert E, BGen USMC, (2004, July 9). Distributed Operations: The Time is 
Now. Marine Corps Gazette, 88, p 35-39. 
Schmidle, Robert E., BGen, USMC. (2004, July). Distributed Operations: From the Sea. 
Marine Corps Gazette, 88, p.70-75. 
Swezey R. W.; Owens J. M.; Bergondy M. L.; Salas E., Task and training requirements 
analysis methodology (TTRAM): an analytic methodology for identifying 
potential training uses of simulator networks in teamwork- intensive task 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
